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1A PROPOSAL TO AMEND RULE 407 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE TO CONFORM WITH 
THE UNDERLYING RELEVANCY RATIONALE FOR THE RULE IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT 
LIABILITY ACTIONS* **
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide for the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence 
on public policy grounds.  Rule 407 is one example.  In its current form as amended in 1997, the 
rule provides:  
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are 
taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less 
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to 
prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a 
product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not 
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for 
another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of 
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.1
What Rule 407 does is to prevent the use of evidence of remedial measures taken after an 
event that caused an injury or harm in order to prove negligence, culpable conduct, or strict 
product liability.  The primary rationale for such exclusion is that individuals, corporations, or 
municipalities should not be discouraged from taking remedial measures that may prevent future 
injury or harm to individuals.  While Rule 407 provides for broad exclusion, its current language 
is limited to remedial measures which are taken after an event that may have caused the injury or 
harm.  We suggest that the language of Rule 407 be amended to preclude the admissibility of 
remedial measures which are taken both before and after an injury.  This change will implement 
the relevancy rationale for the rule. 
 
II. PURPOSE OF 1997 AMENDMENT 
2The original language of the 1975 version of Rule 407 barred the admissibility of 
remedial measures taken “after an event”2 as an admission of negligence or culpable conduct.  
However, this language was ambiguous as to what constituted the critical “event”3 that would 
trigger exclusion.4 The 1997 amendment was intended to clarify this ambiguity by rephrasing 
the rule to only bar remedial measures taken “after an injury or harm, allegedly caused by an 
event.”5 Additionally, the 1997 amendment adopted the predominant judicial view that Rule 407 
also applies to exclude subsequent remedial measures in strict product liability cases.6
The Advisory Committee explained that this change in the language was necessary “to 
clarify that the rule applies only to changes made after the occurrence that produced the damages 
giving rise to the action.”7 The rule “does not apply to bar evidence of preventive measures 
taken before an accident.”8 The amendment was intended to supersede the “minority view that 
applied Rule 407 to exclude ... evidence of pre-accident conduct.”9 The justification was that 
such evidence need not be excluded under Rule 407 but it could be excluded under Rule 401 and 
Rule 403 relevancy principles. 
 
III. HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND DEFINITIONS 
A. Codification of Common Law 
 
Formalization of the exclusion of subsequent remedial measures as an admission of 
negligence or culpability was developed by the courts in England and the United States as a 
common law rule of evidence.10 It precluded the introduction and circumstantial use of evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures to show negligence or culpability.11 As early as 1892, the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that such evidence is “incompetent”12 and noted that 
the only two states that allowed the use of “subsequent changes [as] evidence of prior 
3negligence” – Pennsylvania and Kansas – did not justify their position by “satisfactory 
reasons.”13 In 1942, the American Law Institute (ALI) published the Model Code which became 
the first official collection of common law rules of evidence, including “one of the first, and 
simplest, promulgations of the remedial measures rule.”14 
Almost immediately after its release, the Model Code met strong opposition from within 
the ALI itself.  The dissenting view – that the Model Code granted excessive discretion to the 
trial judge15 – was the major point of contention and is seen as the most “common explanation” 
for the failure of the Model Code.16 Noting the rejection of the Model Code by the states, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) collaborated with the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to create the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence, which offered 
another version of the rule against the admissibility of remedial measures.17 However, this 
proposed reform was met with the same disinterest as the Model Code.  In fact, only three states 
initially adopted the Uniform Rules.18 It was not until January 3, 1975 that President Ford signed 
the new Federal Rules of Evidence into law, thus establishing, at least in the federal courts, an 
exclusionary rule for subsequent remedial measures.19 
B. Purpose of the Rule 
 
Exclusion of evidence under Rule 407 is based on public policy considerations and 
evidentiary rationale.20 Simply stated, the public policy purpose of Rule 407 is to “encourag[e] 
people to take, or at least not discourag[e] them from taking, steps in furtherance of added 
safety”21 and that such remedial measures are “not an admission”22 of negligence, culpable 
conduct, or strict liability in product design, manufacture, or a need for a warning or instruction.  
The evidentiary rationale is that such evidence is unfairly prejudicial with little probative value 
4because it has the potential to excite the sympathies of the jury and to lead it to find liability from 
remedial actions rather than from more relevant and probative evidence.23 
i. Public Policy Basis 
 
Exclusion is founded on public policy considerations that without the protection afforded 
by Rule 407, individuals, corporations, and municipalities would not take corrective steps after 
an injury or harm to prevent similar future injury or harm for fear that evidence of the remedial 
measures would be used against them in future litigation24 to circumstantially show negligence, 
culpability, or strict product liability.25 
Professor Saltzburg has suggested that this policy justification for exclusion under Rule 
407 is flawed because it is probable that a reasonable would-be defendant, even without the 
protection of Rule 407, “would be very likely to take corrective measures in order to avoid more 
serious liability for future accidents.”26 Professor Rice has also suggested that the presumption 
that people may be dissuaded from taking remedial measures, if such evidence could be used as 
an admission of fault, may be defective because such a conclusion requires an acceptance that 1) 
the “existence of the privilege against the introduction of such evidence is generally known,” 
which is highly unlikely; and 2) that “people risk future liability through potential injuries to 
others as a result of the continued existence of the condition, rather than risk the increased 
possibility of being found liable for the injury that has already occurred by changing that 
condition.”27 Nonetheless, in spite of serious logical flaws, this policy rationale remains a 
credible justification for the rule. 
 
ii. Relevancy Basis 
 
5The evidentiary basis for the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures as 
an admission of negligence, culpability, or material issues in product liability cases is a common 
sense conclusion that evidence of remedial measures is of “marginal relevance” and almost 
always substantially more prejudicial than probative.28 Another view suggests that such 
evidence “tends to be more persuasive than is logically justified.”29 The concern is that a jury 
may give excessive weight and consideration to evidence of subsequent remedial measures 
instead of focusing its attention to other more probative evidence on the material facts in dispute.  
In fact, subsequent remedial measures are usually not determinative on the finding that the 
defendant had breached an established duty of care, “because he might have made the repairs to 
correct conditions that either did not exist or were not apparent until after the accident.”30 
iii. Application in Negligence Cases 
 
Cases arising out of negligence require the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a 
“duty not to expose the plaintiff to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury, that the defendant 
breached that duty as defined by the applicable standard of care, that the breach [proximately] 
caused the damage, and that there was actual damage.”31 All four elements must be proved in 
order to establish a prima facia case for negligence.32 
The policy consideration for applying Rule 407 to negligence cases is that the reasonable 
person of ordinary prudence, who becomes aware of a dangerous or a potentially an injury-
causing condition, “may be expected to do everything feasible to remedy that condition 
regardless of the reasonableness of [his] earlier care.”33 The relevancy basis for exclusion under 
Rule 407 is the idea that there is no presumptive connection between an injury and breach of an 
established duty of care.34 This makes evidence of subsequent remedial measures unfairly 
6prejudicial because the jury may become confused and find liability based on the improper 
inference that post injury corrective steps necessarily implies a breach of an established duty of 
care. 
Rule 407 retains the four-part structure of the tort of negligence.  It allows would-be 
defendants an opportunity to “do as they please until they become aware that their actions harm 
others, at which point they acquire a duty to avoid harm[] that cost the victim more than they 
profit the actor.”35 In effect, the rule prevents courts from punishing potential defendants for 
taking remedial measures that “the law and good citizenship require.”36 It avoids imposing 
liability on a defendant who did not have a duty of care, established or implied, but who 
nonetheless made an effort to ensure that similar injury or harm does not take place again, while 
retaining liability where there has been a clear showing of a breach of a duty of care.37 
iv. Application in Strict Product Liability Cases 
 
Strict liability cases require the plaintiff to show that the defendant manufactured, sold, or 
distributed a product with a defective design, manufacture, or insufficient warning.38 Prior to 
1997, there was substantial disagreement among the federal circuits as to whether Rule 407 
applies to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability cases.39 However, 
the 1997 amendment expressly adopted the majority view,40 precluding the use of such evidence 
to show “a defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design or a need for a warning or 
instruction.”41 
Prior to the amendment, the most common and compelling rationale for applying the 
exclusionary rule to product liability actions was grounded on the social policy “desire” not to 
deter remedial measures by manufacturers.42 It has been suggested by Professor Lampert that 
7this justification is not always accurate43 because corporations are under a common statutory 
duty to make repairs and may be liable for punitive damages if they “ignore known dangers.”44 
It is his opinion that this duty and potential statutory liability likely overshadow “any incentive 
the rules of evidence may give them to forgo making repairs.”45 However, as the Ninth Circuit 
explained that practically speaking, there is no “difference between strict liability and negligence 
in defective design cases,”46 and as such, the rationale for encouraging remedial measures 
“remains the same.”47 
From an evidentiary standpoint, the focus of a judicial inquiry in strict liability cases 
centers on the “condition of the product ‘at the time it leaves the seller’s hands’” and not its 
condition at the time of injury.48 To admit evidence of remedial measures taken after the event 
that caused the injury or harm would introduce facts that are outside the scope of the jury’s 
consideration.  Consequently, such evidence becomes unfairly prejudicial because it may lead 
the jury to find liability by considering the condition of the product after remedial measures, 
rather than focusing on the condition of the product at the time that it was released into the 
stream of commerce.49 
C. Remedial Measures 
 
The remedial measure contemplated by Rule 407 is “any kind of change, repair, or 
precaution.”50 While this definition is broad, “acts that do nothing to make the harm less likely 
to occur should not be excluded under Rule 407.”51 This means that remedial measures must 
actually, or be reasonably calculated to, prevent future harm.52 Otherwise, if the conduct does 
nothing to reduce the potential of future injury or harm, it cannot implicate the social policy 
underlying the rule of encouraging injury-reducing repairs.53 This policy would also not be 
8implicated by acts that were not done voluntarily because use of such remedial actions at trial 
would not deter other potential defendants from taking remedial measures that may save them 
from later litigation.54 
i. Measures Taken by Third Party 
 
It is recognized that remedial measures taken by a nonparty to the litigation are outside 
the scope of exclusion under Rule 407.55 For example, in Dixon v. International Harvester 
Co.,56 the plaintiff employee sued the defendant tractor manufacturer for personal injuries that 
allegedly resulted from a defective cab design.57 The Fifth Circuit allowed evidence that after 
the plaintiff’s injury, his employer, who was not a party to litigation, took protective steps to 
prevent future similar injuries by modifying the tractor cab design.58 The court held that 
evidence of remedial steps taken by a nonparty were outside the scope of Rule 407 and were 
circumstantially admissible to show that the tractor was improperly designed.59 The court 
reasoned that the policy of not “discouraging defendants from making necessary repairs or 
changes to products or dangerous conditions” was not applicable where the remedial measures 
were taken by a nonparty to the litigation.60 
Similarly in TLT-Babcock v. Emerson Elec. Co.,61 the Fourth Circuit held that evidence 
of remedial modifications to the design of a ventilation system was properly admitted because it 
was made by the city, a nonparty to the litigation, and not by the defendant who originally 
designed the system.62 The court reasoned that circumstantial use of such evidence was proper 
because a nonparty “will not be inhibited from taking remedial measures if such actions are 
allowed into evidence against the defendant.”63 
9In Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Williams,64 the court distinguished the exclusion of 
subsequent remedial measures taken by a defendant from a nonparty.  The Fifth Circuit opined 
that the admissibility of preventive remedial measures by a defendant should not be used against 
that defendant at trial as an implied admission of liability.65 However, remedial measures taken 
by a nonparty can be admitted against a defendant because the nonparty will not be dissuaded 
from taking future remedial measures since the evidence in question is not being offered against 
it.66 The court reasoned that evidence of repairs made by the State Highway Department, which 
was not a party to the suit, was properly admitted to circumstantially show that a railroad 
crossing was hazardous before and after the injury and prior to the repair.67 
Professor Saltzburg has suggested that since the express language of the rule does 
nothing to distinguish “between measures taken by defendants and nondefendants” it should be 
used to “excludes any measure, which, if taken, would have made the event less likely to occur” 
regardless of who takes such measures.68 Our proposal does not incorporate this view because as 
Saltzburg himself notes that courts usually hold that Rule 407 is inapplicable to exclude remedial 
measures taken by “parties who are not responsible for the injury or harm”69 since a nonparty to 
the litigation “will not be inhibited from taking remedial measures if those measures are used 
against a defendant.”70 
In line with Saltzburg’s observation, the Third Circuit in Diehl v. Blaw-Knox,71 opined 
that “admission of remedial measures by a nonparty necessarily will not expose that nonparty to 
liability, and therefore will not discourage the nonparty from taking the remedial measures in the 
first place.”72 Citing a myriad of cases, the court noted that each of the circuits to address the 
issue has concluded that “Rule 407 does not apply to subsequent remedial measures taken by a 
nonparty.”73 Courts can still exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken by 
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nonparties under Rule 403 as being unfairly prejudicial or under Rule 401 and Rule 402 as not 
relevant.74 
ii. Governmental Mandate 
 
Rule 407 does not exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures “taken by a party 
in response to government regulations.”75 This exception to the exclusionary force of the rule is 
a recognition that the social policy behind the rule of encouraging corrective measures to reduce 
future harm does not apply when corrective action is “mandated by a superior governmental 
authority,”76 because such mandate would not, in other circumstances, dissuade the defendant 
from taking remedial actions.77 
Several circuits have discussed the issue extensively.  For instance, the Fifth Circuit in 
Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc.,78 opined that evidence of remedial measures “made solely in response 
to new federal environmental requirements” and not in response to the accident that gave rise to 
the suit was not a remedial measure contemplated by Rule 407 and was admissible.79 The Ninth 
Circuit in In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia,80 held that when remedial measures were not taken 
voluntarily by the defendant, “the admission of [such] measure[s] into evidence does not 
‘punish’ the defendant for his efforts to remedy his safety problems.”81 Additionally, the Eighth 
Circuit in O'Dell v. Hercules, Inc.,82 explained that evidence of remedial measures compelled by 
superior governmental authority is circumstantially admissible against a defendant “because the 
policy goal of encouraging remediation would not necessarily be furthered by exclusion of such 
evidence.”83 
IV. THE 1997 AMENDMENT DOES NOT FULLY IMPLEMENT THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE 
RULE 
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Legal scholars have argued that the 1997 amendment to Rule 407, that expressly limits 
exclusion of remedial measures to those taken after an event causing injury or harm, does not 
properly implement the public policy that underlies the rule.84 Professor Rice reasons that if 
potential defendants may be held to have implied their negligence, culpability, or strict product 
liability by taking remedial measures, there would be no incentive to take precautions at the time 
they become apparent.85 In effect, would-be defendants would purposefully hold off on taking 
remedial measures in order to take advantage of the “one bite for free” concept.86 
The limiting language of the rule fails to recognize the nature of the critical event that is 
central in both negligence and strict liability cases.87 Professor Rice reasons that since the 
purpose of the subsequent remedial measures rule is to encourage safety measures, “it should be 
of no consequence that the safety measure (including a design change) was taken before the 
accident that gave rise to the action.”88 Specifically, in negligence cases, a defendant cannot be 
held liable for an injury that follows remedial measures because the defendant would “not have 
breached [its] duty of care at the time of the injury, regardless of earlier negligence.”89 In strict 
product liability cases, the requirement of injury as a prerequisite for exclusion of remedial 
measures does nothing to encourage would-be defendants to “come forward with voluntary 
recalls or repairs to their products” before injury occurs.90 It also fails to recognize that evidence 
of remedial measures is not required to find a defendant strictly liable.91 Evidence that the 
product was defective at the time that it was released into the stream of commerce will be 
sufficient to establish a prima facia case.92 
Prior to the 1997 amendment, a number federal circuits excluded evidence of post-
manufacture pre-accident remedial measures under the authority of Rule 407, not per Rule 403, 
holding that the policy of the rule required that such modifications be excluded when offered to 
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show negligence, culpability, or strict product liability.  While these cases constitute a minority 
position, they correctly reflect the underlying public policy.  Some courts have defined the 
“event” language in the rule as the date of sale.  For example, in Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, 
Inc.,93 the plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly refused to admit evidence that the 
defendant manufacturer began to affix warning labels on a hydraulic press prior to the accident.94 
The court reasoned that exclusion under Rule 407 was based on sound public policy intended to 
encourage manufacturers in taking remedial measures in order to prevent potential or future 
harm.95 The Third Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded 
evidence of post-sale pre-accident warning modifications under this rule because the underlying 
policy was “equally as supportive of exclusion of evidence of safety measures taken before 
someone is injured by a newly manufactured product” as after.96 Later, in the same circuit, in 
Kelly v. Crown Equipment Co.,97 the court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of post-
manufacture, pre-accident modifications to a forklift under Rule 407.98 The Third Circuit relied 
on Petree and recognized that since “people are loath to take actions which increase the risk of 
losing a lawsuit,” the rule can properly be applied to exclude pre-accident conduct as a matter of 
social policy.99 The court ultimately held that while the express language of Rule 407 did not 
require the exclusion of pre-accident remedial measures, the policy considerations that form the 
basis of the rule justify such exclusion.100 
Some other courts have treated the “event” language in the rule as being the date of 
manufacture.  On point, in Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,101 the plaintiff, the decedent’s survivor, 
brought suit against the defendant aircraft manufacturer alleging that the defective design of the 
airplane’s control assembly caused the aircraft to crash.102 The plaintiff tried to introduce a 
revised shop manual, published shortly before the accident, explaining how to install the control 
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assembly such as to avoid locking-up of the ailerons.103 The court noted that the exclusion of 
post-manufacture pre-accident remedial measures under Rule 407 “would conform to the policy 
expressed in Rule 403” of excluding evidence that may confuse the jury.104 The court reasoned 
that evidence of “subsequent changes in the product or its design, threatens to confuse the jury 
by diverting its attention from whether the product was defective at the relevant time to what was 
done later.”105 The jury’s attention should be “directed to whether the product was reasonably 
safe at the time it was manufactured” and not at the remedial measures taken after the fact.106 As 
such, the Fifth Circuit held that the modified manual was properly excluded under Rule 407 
because it could have been viewed by the jury as an admission of a defect in product design.107 
Similarly, in Wusinich v. Aeroquip Corp.,108 the plaintiff was injured while operating the 
defendant’s hose assembly machine when his pant leg was caught in the revolving hose.109 He 
alleged that as he pulled his leg away from the machine in an effort to reach the shut-off switch, 
the machine toppled over him, causing the protective guard to open and to expose the plaintiff to 
rotating machinery.110 Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures, such as additional stabilization control, to prevent tipping and 
other safety features, taken by the company after the 1968 manufacture of the machine, but prior 
to the 1991 injury.111 The district court held that evidence of pre-accident, post-manufacture, 
remedial measures should be excluded because the “policy concerns behind Rule 407, such as 
promoting the improvement of product safety, significantly outweigh Plaintiffs' request for 
admission of subsequent remedial measures.”112 
Other federal courts, prior to the 1997 amendment, have held that the language of Rule 
407 did not require exclusion of post-manufacture pre-accident remedial measures.  However, 
these courts still concluded that such evidence was properly excluded under Rule 403 so as to 
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further the policy basis for Rule 407.  For example, in Raymond v. Raymond Corp.,113 the 
decedent was operating a 1981 Model 75 sideloader in the course of his employment at Edgcomb 
Metals in 1987.114 He was fatally injured when his sideloader collided with a steak beam.115 On 
appeal from a verdict in the defendant’s favor on the question of defective product design,116 the 
plaintiff alleged that the district court had improperly excluded evidence of pre-accident remedial 
measures and moved in limine to introduce evidence regarding the “addition of a back-plate to 
[the defendant’s] Model 76 sideloader, which was first manufactured in 1983,” two years after 
the manufacture of the Model 75 sideloader at issue and also four years before the accident.117 
After finding that Rule 407 applies to strict liability cases,118 the court held that only measures 
which take place after the “event” causing injury or harm are excluded under the express 
language of the rule.119 Since the design modifications took place prior to the accident, the court 
noted that Rule 407 does not preclude the admissibility of such evidence.120 However, the court 
excluded the evidence in question under Rule 403 as being more prejudicial than probative, 
relying on the relevancy basis underlying Rule 407 as a reason.121 Such evidence could 
reasonably confuse the jury and divert its attention from the condition of the product at the time 
that it entered the stream of commerce to other matters outside of the scope of the jury’s review.   
Further on point, in Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am.,122 the plaintiff was seriously 
injured in 1992 when her daughter’s 1986 Mercedes Benz 560 SEL rolled from its parking spot 
and struck her down and ran over her ankle.123 In a suit for strict liability, the plaintiff alleged 
that a park ignition interlock, which would have prevented her from removing her key if the car 
was in any other gear than “park,” would have prevented her injury.124 The plaintiff wanted to 
introduce evidence showing that Mercedes Benz began to install a park ignition interlock system 
in all 1990 models.125 Citing Raymond, the court stated that the exclusion of evidence under the 
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express language of Rule 407 “does not apply where, as here, the modification took place before 
the accident that precipitated the suit.”126 Ultimately, the First Circuit held that evidence of pre-
injury modifications, while not expressly excluded by Rule 407, must nonetheless be excluded 
under Rule 403 as it “may reasonably be found unfairly prejudicial to the defendant and 
misleading to the jury” for resolving the strict liability claim.127 The court reasoned that the 
policy behind Rule 407, of not discouraging preventive acts that would reduce the chance of 
future injury or harm, would be furthered if such evidence were excluded. 
The Fifth Circuit, in Foster v. Ford Motor Co.,128 was faced with similar facts.  There, the 
decedent was killed when his 1975 Ford truck swerved and collided into a second truck that was 
heading in the opposite direction.129 The decedent’s widow and two minor children brought a 
wrongful death suit against the manufacturer of the truck, Ford Motor Co., alleging that the 
truck’s suspension system was defective.130 On appeal, the plaintiffs complained that the district 
court had improperly excluded evidence that some time after the manufacture and sale of the 
Ford truck in question, but before the accident itself, “Ford changed the spacer block assembly 
for 1976 and 1977 model trucks, casting it as one unit.”131 The plaintiffs intended to show that 
had the decedent’s truck incorporated the alternative design, the accident would not have 
occurred.132 However, the court noted that Ford had already conceded that the alternative design 
was feasible.133 As such, the policy and relevancy consideration supporting exclusion under 
Rule 407 allowed the court to properly exclude evidence of pre-injury remedial measures by 
applying Rule 403 in order to protect defendants who take the initiative to make preventive 
corrections from implying any wrongful conduct as “cumulative, [and] at worst, unfair, 
misleading, or confusing.”134 
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As a result of differing judicial interpretation and application of Rule 407, the need for 
clarification was necessary.  During the April 22, 1996 meeting of the Judiciary Advisory 
Committee in Washington D.C., two unnamed commentators proposed to extend the rule to 
products liability actions in order to “bar evidence of remedial measures taken after the sale of 
the product even if the changes occurred before the event causing injury or harm.”135 This 
proposal was rejected as being unnecessary without the benefit of a discussion or reasons.136 
Even though the Advisory Committee failed to undertake a revision of the rule, some 
independent organizations and courts had recognized the need to expand exclusion under Rule 
407 and to include pre-event remedial measures regardless of the underlying cause of action – 
negligence or strict products liability.137 
A. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 
 
One of the most influential proponents of a revision to the language of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence as a whole, including Rule 407, is the NCCUSL, a non-profit unincorporated 
association comprised of approximately three hundred commissioners – law practitioners and 
legal academicians.138 The organization is endorsed by the ABA to promote uniformity among 
state rules and procedures.139 The NCCUSL has been working toward uniformity in state laws 
since 1892,140 and began its partnership with the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1940 to 
produce the UCC.141 
Unlike the language of the current Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
proposed Rule 407 within the Uniform Rules of Evidence would have precluded the 
admissibility of evidence of post-manufacture, pre-injury remedial measures.142 This expansion 
of the scope of exclusion under the rule is achieved by defining the term “event” to include the 
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“sale of a product to a user or consumer” in the last sentence of the Rule.143 Defining the scope 
of the critical “event” was intended to reflect the judgment of the commissioners that the social 
policy of the rule would be better served if all would-be defendants were given “an incentive to 
take remedial measured before the injury, or harm, giving rise to the cause of action.”144 
B. The Evidence Project 
 
Professor Paul Rice is another influential legal authority and reform proponent.  He has 
been a constant critic of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as 
the current state of the federal rules.145 In order to further his reform initiative, Professor Rice 
has established the Evidence Project,146 an extensive agenda of proposed changes to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence created through a seminar course in evidence taught at the Washington 
College of Law of the American University.147 Professor Rice explains that the proposed 
revisions to the Federal Rules are intended to create “consistency within the rule and between the 
rules, consistency with the theory of our adjudicatory process, [and] consistency with the 
Constitution.”148 
The proposed Rule 407, as presented by the Evidence Project, would result in the total 
exclusion of all evidence of remedial measures, regardless of when they were taken.149 This 
result is accomplished by removing any reference to the critical “event” language that would 
otherwise trigger exclusion under the rule.150 Professor Rice notes that the limitation in the 
current Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, excluding evidence of remedial measures 
only if taken after an event that causes injury or harm, makes the rule difficult to apply151 
especially in situations where the decision to repair was made before an accident, but the repair 
was not actually made until after the accident, or where studies about the need for repair were 
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made before the accident, but the decision to make such repairs followed the accident.152 He 
concludes that “if all remedial measure[s] were made privileged, the current difficulties and 
conflicts [in applying the rule] would be avoided.”153 
C. Illinois Exclusion of Remedial Measures 
 
Illinois evidentiary rulings, like Federal Rule 407,154 exclude evidence of remedial 
measures in negligence155 and strict liability actions.156 However, in a substantial departure from 
the Federal Rule, Illinois courts do not admit evidence of remedial measures taken prior to the 
event that gave rise to the cause of action.157 Illinois courts have reasoned that to allow the 
admissibility of evidence of post-manufacture preventive changes would have an adverse effect 
on future safety advancements.158 For this reason, Illinois courts exclude evidence of 
improvements taken before or after an event causing an injury in both strict liability and 
negligence cases.159 This is also the position of several other state courts.160 
In a strict liability case, Smith v. Black & Decker,161 after accidentally amputating his left 
hand with a power miter saw, the plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer, alleging that the 
design of the saw was defective because it was not equipped with a right lower blade guard.162 
On plaintiff’s appeal, the Illinois appellate court held that the trial court had properly granted the 
defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of post-manufacture, pre-injury modifications to the 
miter saw.163 The court reasoned that “the same policy consideration, i.e., the potential chilling 
effect on safety improvements is present in product liability actions as in negligence actions 
regardless of whether the modification were pre-injury or post injury.”164 
Several years later in Brown v. Ford Motor Co.,165 the plaintiff, a survivor of a van 
explosion, brought a product liability action against the defendant manufacturer alleging that 
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faulty nylon fuel lines in the van melted and leaked gasoline, and that this was the direct cause of 
the explosion.166 The Illinois appellate court found that the trial court properly excluded 
evidence that after the sale of the van in question, but before the accident, the defendant had 
changed the fuel lines from plastic to metal.167 Citing Smith v. Black & Decker, the court held 
that the public policy underlying the exclusion of remedial measures applies to bar the 
admissibility of such evidence regardless of whether it was taken before or after the accident.168 
In Carrizales v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,169 a case based on a negligence cause of action, the 
plaintiff sued the defendant manufacturer to recover damages for personal injuries sustained 
when flammable vapors from his clothing were ignited by the flame of a gas-fired hot water 
heater.170 Noting that the relevant time period in a negligent manufacture cause of action is the 
“time of sale or manufacture,”171 the court reasoned that to allow the admissibility of pre-injury 
remedial measured to show negligence would “have a chilling effect on the incentive to improve 
safety” in mass produced and widely-used products.172 The Illinois appellate court held that the 
exclusion of evidence that the manufacturer of a water heater had placed warning labels on its 
heaters after the date of manufacture, but before the date of injury, was proper.173 
V. PROPOSAL TO AMEND RULE 407 
 
We basically reach the same conclusion as does Professor Rice, although our proposal 
relies more on the evidentiary relevancy rationale for amending the rule than the social policy 
rationale that he and his project have advanced.  Nonetheless, we endorse the language that he 
has proposed for amending Rule 407.  The amended rule should read as follows:  
 
Remedial measures are not admissible to prove negligence, culpable 
conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for 
a warning or instruction.  Evidence of remedial measures may be admitted 
20  
if offered for impeachment or another purpose, if controverted, such as 
proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measure. 
 
Removing the “after an injury or harm” language from the text of the current rule is 
intended to explicitly state that exclusion under the rule is not restricted to remedial measures 
taken after an event.174 The removal of any language referring to an “event” is aimed at reducing 
confusion as to the meaning or scope of the rule.  Although terms can be qualified or defined 
within the text of a rule, removing the phrase completely would foster uniform decisions and 
encourage consistency, both textual and logical, within the rule in question and between all of 
the rules together.175 This proposed rule would clearly conform Rule 407 to the public policy 
that underlies the exclusion of remedial measures as an admission of negligence, culpability, or 
product defect, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The proposed amendment to the current Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence will 
encourage, without limitation, individuals, corporations, and municipalities to make remedial 
measures which would prevent future injury or harm.  Such remedial measures, whether taken 
before or after an injury, must not be deemed to be admissions of negligence, culpability, product 
defect, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction.  When courts admit 
evidence of pre-injury remedial actions they act contrary to the public policy of the rule and 
create a danger of jury confusion by providing them evidence that is more prejudicial than 
probative on the material issues in the case. 
To counter this problem, some federal courts have excluded pre-injury remedial measures 
under a Rule 403 balancing process.  In their view, Rule 403 operates to further the policy that 
underlies Rule 407.  In our view, Rule 403 is not the answer.  In order to promote logical 
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consistency within Rule 407 and among the other Federal Rules of Evidence, the rule itself, and 
not Rule 403, should control the exclusion of evidence of remedial measures.
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